The Georgia Supreme Court today ruled in Handel v Powell that Jim Powell, candidate for the Public Service Commission, District 4, was qualified to run.

You can read the entire opinion here, or this excerpt:

The superior court determined the Secretary made such an error of law when she concluded that the candidate’s homestead exemption on property outside the District was sufficient to determine that the candidate did not reside in the District.3 We agree with the superior court that the Secretary committed an error of law that authorizes reversal of the Secretary’s decision.

The Secretary acknowledged in her decision the existence in OCGA § 21-2-217 of “a set of rules” to be followed in determining residency to qualify to run for elective office, but employed only one of the fifteen rules contained in the set, the “homestead exemption” subsection. When the issue is the residence of a person desiring to qualify to run for elective office, OCGA § 21-2-217(a) directs that the rules contained therein are to be followed “so far as they are applicable[.]” The facts of the case at bar call into consideration at least seven of the fifteen rules: Subsections 1, 2, 3, 4.1, 6, and 9, as well as the homestead exemption rule found in subsection 14.4 but the Secretary’s decision did not take into account any of the applicable rules other than the homestead exemption rule. The Secretary’s analysis had the effect of elevating the “homestead exemption” rule of OCGA § 21-2-217(a) above the remaining rules contained therein, effectively eviscerating their application in any case questioning the qualifications of a candidate for elective office should the candidate own a home on which a homestead exemption is enjoyed. A statute must be construed “to give sensible and intelligent effect to all [its] provisions and to refrain from any interpretation which renders any part of the statute meaningless.” R. D. Brown Constrs. v. Bd. of Educ. of Columbia County, 280 Ga. 210, 212 (626 SE2d 471) (2006). Had the General Assembly intended such a preeminent role for the homestead exemption in determining the residence of a person desiring to qualify to run for elective office, it would have so stated in OCGA § 21-2 -217(a). Inasmuch as the superior court did not err when it reversed the decision of the Secretary, we affirm the judgment of the superior court.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.